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1. Introducti on
One of the goals of the Partnership Resource Centre (PRC) is to execute evidence-based research and further develop 
a theoreti cal framework on the linkages between partnerships and value chain development (ECSAD 2009). Within the 
PRC Trajectory on Global Value Chains, this goal was speciﬁ ed into the explicit objecti ve to improve public knowledge of 
how partnerships shape or organise the process of inclusion of smallholders and small and medium enterprises (SMEs) 
in (global) value chains, resulti ng in more local sustainable competi ti veness (Van Wijk and Vellema 2010).
The global value chains trajectory takes as point of departure the multi tude of insti tuti onal constraints that prevent 
primary producers and SMEs from exploiti ng local and foreign market opportuniti es. Apart from adverse climate con-
diti ons, limitati ons in infrastructure, and health and educati on issues, market-oriented acti viti es are hampered by the 
lack of an appropriate insti tuti onal business environment. Especially the rural poor oft en have no proper access to, for 
instance, credit, technology, or land ti tles, while their market prospects are insecure (Markelova et al 2009; Poulton et al 
2006). Value chain partnerships are increasingly considered to be useful vehicles to tackle these limitati ons, evidenced 
in the acti ve promoti on of parti cularly bi-parti te partnerships between companies and non-governmental organizati ons 
(NGOs). The synergy derived from partnership cooperati on can overcome failures resulti ng from unilateral acti on by ac-
tors conﬁ ned within one of the societal sectors (Kolk et al 2008). By addressing the insti tuti onal business environment, 
partnerships can play a pivotal role in enhancing the chances for primary producers and SMEs to turn themselves into 
viable suppliers of local or global value chains (Bitzer et al 2011) in support of sustainable, local economic development.
The aim of this discussion paper is to lay the groundwork for a conceptual framework that addresses the above issues. 
Since we consider insti tuti onal change the raison d’être of value chain partnerships, we use a selecti on of insti tuti onal 
theory as ingredient for developing an integrati ve theoreti cal approach. Insti tuti ons are concerned with the rules for the 
behaviour of organizati ons and individuals, and they are both formal (legal rules that apply to all) and informal (norms 
and customs that apply to speciﬁ c groups). Relevant in PRC context are those insti tuti ons that prevent or facilitate the 
involvement of smallholders and SMEs, such as the behavioural rules for buyers when making purchasing commitments 
to producers, or for banks when lending to smallholders, or the rules for smallholders how they honour their contracts 
with buyers and banks. Our interest in such insti tuti ons ranges from the way they emerge (who dominates this process 
of emergence, and who wins and who loses from the insti tuti on?), the ways in which they are monitored and enforced, 
to the pressures for change. Our focal point is insti tuti onal change, which we consider a socio-politi cal process rather 
than a technicaladministrati ve procedure. The paper aims to inform and promote discussion on the roles and functi ons 
of partnerships in arranging such a process when they intervene in the insti tuti onal environment of value chains.
Methodologically the paper explores an approach that rests on a multi plicity of competi ng theories and encourages 
theoreti cal pluralism in order to detect plausible causal pathways in the process of insti tuti onal change (Vellema, 2011). 
Accordingly, our theoreti cal exercise encompasses three diﬀ erent approaches. The next secti on reviews key concepts in 
insti tuti onal theory that are useful to explain the existence of market insti tuti ons and the conditi ons under which they 
change. The insti tuti onal approach is subsequently applied to the emergence of private quality standards, which con-
sti tutes one strategy for partnerships to induce change in market insti tuti ons. The third secti on addresses the change 
process itself and describes the concept of ‘insti tuti onal entrepreneur’ in insti tuti onal theory to examine the role of 
value chain partnerships. Secti on four focuses on the internal dynamics of partnerships. By drawing on cultural theory, it 
explores how actors agree to cooperate and to deal with risks within this new social arrangement. Finally, in secti on ﬁ ve, 
we discuss the potenti al of the three approaches and explain the dynamics and viability of partnerships, conceptualised 
as an insti tuti onal expression of societal ordering. Our conclusion is that combining theoreti cal frameworks, and in this 
paper we selected three complementary frameworks, is a conditi on for using case studies of value chain partnerships 
to inform and promote strategic debate about the roles of partnerships in development processes. In future research, 
we intend to ground research in case studies suggested by our partners and to iterate empirical ﬁ ndings with alternati ve 
hypotheses derived from theoreti cal literature.
2. Insti tuti onal theory and value chain partnerships
2.1 What are social insti tuti ons?
The literature on social insti tuti ons is not unequivocal in deﬁ ning precisely what an insti tuti on is. However, there is 
consensus on insti tuti ons as the standards for social behaviour that give society stability. They involve the constraints 
and prescripti ons to individuals and groups in the pursuit of their respecti ve goals (see e.g. Goodin 1998: 20; Oﬀ e 1998: 
200; Scott  1995: 33). Social insti tuti ons are “organized patt erns of socially constructed norms and roles, and socially 
prescribed behaviours of occupants of those roles, which are created and re-created over ti me” (Goodin 1998: 19). Insti -
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tuti ons establish the standards as to what is considered to be normal, what must be expected, what can be relied upon, 
and which rights and duti es are att ached to which positi ons. An insti tuti onalized setti  ng reduces uncertainty because it 
makes behaviour more predictable, and unburdens social actors from conti nuously making strategic decisions. 
Insti tuti onalism has diﬀ erent meanings in various social science disciplines (Powell and DiMaggio 1991: 1), while there 
are also signiﬁ cant diﬀ erences between “old” and “new” forms of insti tuti onalism. Since the present project focuses on 
partnerships that induce change in market insti tuti ons to facilitate inclusion in global value chains, we brieﬂ y discuss the 
main insti tuti onal assumpti ons of two relevant disciplines: economics and organizati onal theory. 
In economics, new insti tuti onalism reacted primarily to the orthodox version of the neoclassical paradigm assuming free 
agents interacti ng in an idealized free market. New insti tuti onal economics is sti ll based on the neoclassical assumpti ons 
but the agents are considered to be constrained by unequal market power among economic actors, cogniti ve limitati ons, 
incomplete informati on and challenges with monitoring and enforcing contracts. Insti tuti ons, or the rules that constrain 
choice, have historically been developed to reduce these transacti on costs in trading (Goodin 1998: 7-10). They channel 
informati on about market conditi ons, goods, and parti cipants, they deﬁ ne and enforce property rights and contracts, 
determining who gets what and when, and they increase competi ti on in markets – or decrease it (World Bank 2002: 8).
New insti tuti onal economics disti nguishes between formal and informal market insti tuti ons. Formal insti tuti ons have 
writt en rules encoded in law, whereas informal insti tuti ons are embodied in customs, traditi ons, and codes of conduct. 
They are “norm-based”, rooted in culture (World Bank 2002: 171-172), or “socially embedded” (Williamson 2000: 596). 
Formal and informal insti tuti ons diﬀ er in two important aspects: scope and sancti oning. Informal insti tuti ons are smaller 
in scope as they apply to speciﬁ c groups and are discriminati ve against non-group members (Jüti ng 2003). Formal in-
sti tuti ons apply to all under a parti cular nati onal jurisdicti on. They ensure all citi zens equal rights and protect them 
against arbitrary decisions of politi cal authoriti es, and therefore appear as neutral. Formal insti tuti ons are enforced by 
state organs, involving prosecuti on and legal sancti oning, whereas compliance with informal insti tuti ons is enforced by 
social exclusion or related forms such as sti gmati zati on, blacklisti ng, or boycott . The (historically) increasing complexity 
of market transacti ons has raised the need for impersonal regulati on of the market which gave rise to the development 
of formal market insti tuti ons. Such a transiti on is part of a broader development in consti tuti onal ordering in which the 
“rule of man” is replaced by the “rule of law” (Carothers 1998; Stephenson 2003).
Sociology and organizati onal theory are scepti cal toward rati onal-actor forms of organizati ons, and emphasize social 
structures that constrain or shape actor’s acti ons, choices and decisions. Insti tuti onalizati on is considered a state-de-
pendent process which limits organizati ons in the opti ons they can pursue. Environments and culture are major deter-
minants of organizati onal behaviour (Powell and DiMaggio 1991: 12). However, signiﬁ cant diﬀ erences can be found 
between “old” and “new” insti tuti onalism. 
Old insti tuti onalism explains the limited rati onality of organizati ons by conﬂ icts and vested interests that result in trade-
oﬀ s and alliances. The organizati onal structure is considered to be inﬂ uenced by informal interacti ons (coaliti ons, cliques) 
that may deviate from formal structure and constrain such structure. Old insti tuti onalism tends to focus on organizati ons 
embedded through multi ple informal personal ti es with local communiti es. It accepts that individuals follow their own 
interests and strategy, but that does not lead to organizati onal rati onality. Organizati ons cannot be directed by individu-
als (Powell and DiMaggio 1991: 11-14). The relati onship between a social actor’s moti vati on and social insti tuti ons is 
reciprocal. Individuals shape insti tuti ons but insti tuti ons, in turn, generate social actors who get used to and internalise 
some of the values the insti tuti ons embody. Thus besides curbing opportunisti c behaviour, insti tuti ons perform a posi-
ti ve functi on by providing social actors the “socially validated standards as to what is preferred and licensed” (Oﬀ e 1998: 
200). They inﬂ uence people’s percepti ons of their interests, and their views on the legiti macy of parti cular targets for, 
and types of politi cal acti on (Chang 2002: 556).
New insti tuti onalism in organizati on theory tends to downplay conﬂ icts of interests within and between organizati ons, 
and seeks answers for the limited rati onality of organizati ons in the formal structure. New insti tuti onalism stresses that 
insti tuti onalism is a cogniti ve process; rather than norms and values, taken-for-granted scripts and rules consti tute insti -
tuti ons. It focuses on organizati ons embedded in environments that are non-local, including either organizati onal sec-
tors or ﬁ elds (e.g. industries, professions, nati onal societi es). Such environments inﬂ uence the organizati ons by creati ng 
lenses through which actors perceive the world. The focus is therefore more on inter-organizati onal structures (Powell 
and DiMaggio 1991: 11-14).
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2.2. Insti tuti onal change
Insti tuti ons can only be eﬀ ecti ve when they ﬁ t in their social environment. Oﬀ e (1998: 202) speaks in this respect of 
the “dual nature” of insti tuti ons. They socialize and consolidate beliefs by disciplining and licensing, but, in order to be 
eﬀ ecti ve, they must make sense and be ﬁ t for their mission. Social actors must be able to trust insti tuti ons. Prescribed 
behaviour must result in the expected outcome. If not, the insti tuti on may lose parts of its consti tuency and become
contested. Generally speaking, there are two, oft en related, instances where a market insti tuti on may lose its ﬁ t with the 
environment: when its consti tuency changes or when the market changes.
Insti tuti onal change may take four diﬀ erent forms (Jepperson 1991: 152):
(a) Insti tuti onal formati on, which is an “exit from social entropy”. This involves radical changes, such as the insti tuti on-
 alizati on of the self as an enti ty that is diﬀ erenti ated from nature or God.
(b) Insti tuti onal development, which represents “insti tuti onal conti nuati on rather than an exit”. The change takes place 
 within the context and rules of the existi ng insti tuti on and may be considered an adjustment.
(c) Deinsti tuti onalizati on involves an “exit from insti tuti onalizati on, toward reproducti on through recurrent acti on”. An
 example is the deinsti tuti onalizati on of gender as central socioorganizati onal vehicle.
(d) Re-insti tuti onalizati on, which represents an “exit from one insti tuti onalizati on and entry into another form, organi-
 zed around diﬀ erent principles or rules”.
Only two of these forms seem applicable to the changing of market insti tuti ons to make value chains more inclusive 
to SMEs and smallholders in developing countries: insti tuti onal development and re-insti tuti onalizati on. Especially the 
latt er form of change is relevant because in most developing countries that are in the process of ‘building insti tuti ons’ 
(World Bank 2002) insti tuti onal change usually stands for imitati ng models that already exist in other countries. The ad-
vantage of imitati on is that it saves ti me as it avoids reinventi ng the wheel. However, imported insti tuti ons carry the risk 
of not performing as anti cipated, because the consti tuency and the markets diﬀ er. Foreign insti tuti ons have grown out 
of a speciﬁ c cultural, economic, and politi cal infrastructure that may have other outcomes under diﬀ erent conditi ons.
2.3 Insti tuti onal compliance
To be eﬀ ecti ve, insti tuti onal change needs to be implemented. All who operate under the changed insti tuti on must 
comply with the new formal or informal rule or norm. Compliance is rule-consistent behaviour (Börzel 2000; Faure and 
Lefevre 1999). The issue of compliance has oft en been empirically analysed in the context of internati onal relati ons lit-
erature about the design and enforcement of new internati onal treati es. Such treati es require cooperati on among states 
to form and enforce ‘regimes’, which are social insti tuti ons at the internati onal level. A central problem in cooperati on is 
free-riding and opti ons to reduce such behaviour have therefore been prominent on both policy and research agendas. 
Even though the level of analysis and the type of stakeholders under these inter-governmental insti tuti ons diﬀ er from 
those related to value chains, the compliance mechanisms at work in internati onal regimes serve as a model for the 
analysis of compliance in respect of other types of insti tuti ons. Regime theory on compliance teaches us parti cularly 
what compliance or non-compliance actually is and how it can be promoted and enforced.
Deﬁ ning compliance is challenging because there is no clear cut boundary between compliance and non-compliance. 
Strict compliance with insti tuti ons is almost never achieved, and it hardly seems realisti c to make everyone comply en-
ti rely with the norm. Rather, the key issue is to keep deviance from the norm or standard within an “acceptable level” 
(Chayes and Chayes 1993: 198). Compliance is actually a goal, a ﬁ nal stage of a process in which divergent interests and 
problem percepti ons are reconciled through a process that involves interpretati on, contestati on, negoti ati on, coopera-
ti on and conﬂ ict (Börzel 2000).
In the insti tuti onal literature, the causes of deviance and advancement of compliance have been explained from three 
diﬀ erent angles that are coined as “managerial”, “enforcement”, and “normati ve” approaches. In the managerial ap-
proach, it is assumed that actors voluntarily enter into a cooperati ve agreement and, hence, have a propensity to com-
ply. Deviance or noncompliance is considered to be either temporary, for example during transiti onal periods; parti al, 
when actors comply with some elements of a rule but not with others (Mitchell 1994b); or unintenti onal (Chayes and 
Chayes 1993). Unintenti onal non-compliance may occur due to ambiguous language in the provisions so that stakehold-
ers do not know precisely what is expected from them, or may be caused by the incapability of stakeholders to fully carry 
out their obligati ons because of technological or ﬁ nancial limitati ons. Consequently, compliance is promoted through 
clarifying and specifying the rules, by removing the barriers to comply with problem-solving based on capacity building, 
dispute sett lement and transparency (Tallberg 2002), and “jawboning”, i.e. pressure through strong persuasion rather 
than sancti ons (Chayes and Chayes, 1993).
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The enforcement approach involves collecti ve acti on and game theory models that assume actors take decisions based 
on a cost-beneﬁ t rati onality. Within this approach, compliance is based on inﬂ uencing actors through incenti ves that 
raise actors’ cost of non-compliance such as high probability of detecti on through monitoring and severity of sancti ons 
(Tallberg 2002; Young 2001). From this viewpoint, the managerial approach is overly opti misti c about the actors’ willing-
ness to comply, parti cularly in respect of deeper forms of cooperati on that involve more demanding changes and that 
would require more robust enforcing mechanisms (Downs et al 1996).
In the normati ve approach, the compati bility of new rules with existi ng norms and beliefs, and regulatory standards is 
thought to determine actors’ willingness to comply (Börzel 2000). Normati ve compati bility is required to get the new 
rules accepted so that they generate trust among the stakeholders. This requires insti tuti ons to be rooted in the appro-
priate moral and cultural infrastructure (Oﬀ e 1998), to be “ideologically embedded” (Jenkins 2003), or to ﬁ t the nati onal 
“hierarchy of rights” (Chang 2002). The separati on of design and implementati on functi ons increases the chances for a 
normati ve misﬁ t when “rule targets”, those whose behaviour is supposed to change under the new rule, do not accept 
the new rules agreed upon by “rule addressees”, those who generate and adopt a new norm or rule (Börzel 2000). At the
global level, states are usually the addressees of internati onal treati es, and they are formally responsible for compliance. 
However, it is oft en the behaviour of non-state actors, such as companies, that is targeted for change.
2.4 Changing (global) value chain insti tuti ons
Value chain partnerships may follow two disti nct strategies of inducing change in market insti tuti ons to make value 
chains more inclusive to smallholders and SMEs. Insti tuti onal change may be promoted by changes in the chain-internal 
governance by designing and adopti ng private quality standards. The second strategy is through local value chain facili-
tati on where organizati ons that are external to the chain induce insti tuti onal change by forging closer relati onships and 
building trust between value chain actors in a speciﬁ c geographic context (see for a more comprehensive explanati on of 
the two strategies: project report 2109b, building bloc 2). 
For both the verti cal and horizontal change-inducing strategies to be adopted and diﬀ used, local stakeholders (the rule 
targets) must comply with the new norms. This may be a challenging task considering that such change processes in 
developing countries oft en involve “reinsti tuti onalizati on”, the introducti on of another form of insti tuti onalizati on, or-
ganized around diﬀ erent principles or rules than local stakeholders are used to. Below we apply the insti tuti onal view on 
the verti cal strategy in which quality standards are used as vehicle to induce change in market insti tuti ons.
Quality standards are insti tuti onal arrangements intended to change the behaviour of producers and retailers connected 
through supply or value chains. They are “external points of reference by which a product or a service’s performance, 
its technical and physical characteristi cs, and/or process and conditi ons under which it has been produced or delivered, 
can be assessed” (Nadviand Wältring 2004: 56). These external points of reference are socially constructed norms or 
rules that constrain and prescribe customs and acti viti es of ﬁ rms and farmers involved in the producti on or marketi ng of 
a product. For example, in order to sell a mango as an organic product, the enti re supply chain, from farmer to retailer, 
must adhere to the norms to produce organically and must cooperate to preserve the organic identi ty of the fruit unti l 
its arrival at the retail shelves.
Quality standards are, in part, social insti tuti ons because they are humanly devised rules for behaviour, and horizontal 
and triadic in nature. They may be formal insti tuti ons when they involve legal regulati ons to which companies must 
adhere, for instance in respect of standards protecti ng public health. In such cases, it is the government that acts as 
third party and enforcer of the insti tuti on. However, all sustainability quality standards that have been created without 
government involvement and adopted voluntarily should be considered as informal insti tuti ons. These have a normati ve 
rather than a legal base. They are applicable to a speciﬁ c group of actors rather than to all citi zens under a parti cular na-
ti onal jurisdicti on and violati on is sancti oned by social exclusion rather than by legal prosecuti on. Companies intending 
to operate more sustainably respond to emerging new norms promoted by speciﬁ c civil society organizati ons. They in-
tend to change the norms of their corporate behaviour, and therefore necessarily of their suppliers, by adopti ng quality 
standards designed either in partnership with civil society organizati ons, or by themselves or with their business associa-
ti ons. Consumers serve as the independent third party. They judge and eventually sancti on the corporate performance 
on normati ve grounds through their buying behaviour. Public disapproval of a ﬁ rm’s product may result in a diminishing 
demand or even a consumer boycott . It is therefore imperati ve to convince consumers of the trustworthiness and eﬀ ec-
ti veness of the company’s product labels. This requires the ﬁ rm to show its ability to introduce the quality standard into 
its enti re supply chain, and to ensure that all suppliers in the chain comply with the rules set out in the quality standard.
Private sector actors aligned in a supply chain cooperate with one another to bring a new product or service to the mar-
ket. New quality standards are commonly introduced by the chain’s lead ﬁ rm and then adopted by individual suppliers 
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and traders in the chain. From a formal point of view, this adopti on is voluntarily. They are independent organizati ons 
and are free to reject the new constraints and prescripti ons in the new standard. However, due to the market realiti es 
and the power inequaliti es among the chain actors, suppliers are de facto oft en dependent on the lead ﬁ rm and may feel 
they have litt le other opti on than to adopt the required private rules. This implies that supplying ﬁ rms may feel more 
or less forced to adopt the quality standard, rendering the standard a social insti tuti on that is not based on a pro-acti ve 
consent of its prime stakeholders. Rather, in supply chain situati ons private quality standards resemble what Oﬀ e (1998: 
203) coins an “organizati onal duty”, a related social arrangement which is hierarchical and dyadic. Organizati onal duti es 
are rules for behaviour that are unilaterally imposed by the management of an organizati on on its employees who have 
to abide to these rules or run the risk of being excluded from the organizati on.
Hence, from an insti tuti onal theory perspecti ve, private quality standards are on the one hand horizontally designed 
informal social insti tuti ons, whereas on the other hand they are verti cal (quasi) organizati onal duti es (Figure 1). Despite 
the fact that the rati onale of many of the sustainability standards is to support primary producers or workers in the 
chain, the standard’s conditi ons may sti ll be seen as a more or less imposed duty when the direct local beneﬁ t is not vis-
ible enough, or when the standard supports some local stakeholders (e.g. workers) but not others (their employers). This 
ambiguous feature of private quality standards may have a considerable eﬀ ect on the suppliers’ willingness to comply, 
and, hence, the standard’s eﬀ ecti veness.
Absence of a supporti ve social environment may be a powerful incenti ve for deviati on by the rule targets resulti ng in in-
sti tuti onal failure and high costs for monitoring and enforcement. In this case, compliance should be advanced by chang-
ing the normati ve views through social learning, habitualizati on and persuasion. Eﬀ ecti ve insti tuti ons change beliefs and 
norms of the regulated actors (Börzel 2000; Oﬀ e 1998; Simmons 1998; Young 2001).
Figure 1: Private quality standard as mechanism for insti tuti onal change
3. Collecti ve insti tuti onal entrepreneurship in value chain upgrading
Global value chains are complex conﬁ gurati ons that consist of organizati onal actors operati ng across geographical 
boundaries and involved in the design, development and marketi ng of a product or service to its end use and beyond. 
Small holder producers and SMEs in emerging economies face the challenge to become and stay competi ti ve players in 
such value chains while operati ng in setti  ngs with weak regulati ve systems, limited access to technology, knowledge and
capital and bad transportati on and communicati on infrastructure (Mesquita & Lazzarini, 2008). Changes in the insti tu-
ti onal environment or resource environment may thus have signiﬁ cant consequences for the competi ti veness of these 
entrepreneurs.
Partnerships among ﬁ rms, NGOs and governmental actors are increasingly considered powerful mechanisms to foster the 
inclusion of small holder producers and entrepreneurs in value chains. They bring together public and private actors so as to 
establish producti on standards, improve the ﬂ ow of informati on, support technology and knowledge development, enhance 
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verti cal and horizontal collaborati ve arrangements and improve the access to new markets (e.g., Gibbon, 2001; Kolk, van 
Tulder, & Kostwinder, 2008; McDermott , 2007). Thus partnerships may advance value chain upgrading processes.
In this brief research paper, we argue that the emergent theory of insti tuti onal entrepreneurship is well-suited to bett er 
understand the role of partnerships in value chain upgrading. I ﬁ rst introduce the concept of insti tuti onal entrepreneur-
ship, describing which actors perform this role, in what way and to what eﬀ ect. I conclude by outlining how this concept 
may advance research on value chain partnerships.
3.1 Who are insti tuti onal entrepreneurs?
The concept of insti tuti onal entrepreneurship has received substanti al scholarly att enti on in organizati onal insti tuti onal 
theory. It was introduced to bett er understand the role of agency in insti tuti onal change and refers to “organized actors 
with suﬃ  cient resources who see in the creati on of new insti tuti ons an opportunity to realize their interests” (DiMag-
gio, 1988: 14). Scott  (2008: 98) deﬁ nes insti tuti onal entrepreneurs as “people (or organizati ons) who parti cipate in the 
creati on of new types of organizati ons or new industries, tasks that require marshalling new technologies, designing 
new organizati onal forms and routi nes, creati ng new supply chains and markets, and gaining cogniti ve, normati ve and 
regulatory legiti macy.”
Empirical accounts of insti tuti onal entrepreneurship have shown that the role of insti tuti onal entrepreneur might be 
enacted by a variety of actors such as professional associati ons (Lawrence, 1999), ﬁ rms (Greenwood & Suddaby, 2006; 
Munir & Phillips, 2005), NGOs (Lawrence, Hardy & Phillips, 2002) and governmental bodies (Child, Lu & Tsai, 2007).
Whereas most studies of insti tuti onal entrepreneurship focus on a single or small group of actors performing the role of 
insti tuti onal entrepreneur (e.g., Maguire, Hardy & Lawrence, 2004; Mutch, 2007), literature has recently begun to sug-
gest that insti tuti onal entrepreneurship is a form of collecti ve acti on in which actors, with diﬀ erent goals, interests and 
resources, establish collaborati ve arrangements to jointly work for insti tuti onal change (Wijen & Ansari, 2007). Examples 
of such collecti ve insti tuti onal entrepreneurship are found in the eﬀ orts to combat child labour in Pakistan (Khan, Munir, 
& Willmott , 2007) and the individuals and organizati ons working against climate change (Wijen & Ansari, 2007).
3.2 Why do actors engage in insti tuti onal entrepreneurship?
One of the major issues in the emergent theory of insti tuti onal entrepreneurship is the questi on how actors are able 
to signal opportuniti es for insti tuti onal change since these actors are constrained in their behaviour by the very same 
insti tuti ons they seek to change (Batti  lana, 2006; Greenwood & Suddaby, 2006). It is beyond the scope of this research 
to elaborate on this debate. However, simply put, actors are considered to be reﬂ exive agents to their insti tuti onal envi-
ronment and thus able to engage in strategic acti on to alter existi ng insti tuti ons or create new ones that align with their 
interests. Yet, actors diﬀ er in their degree of reﬂ exivity.
Following DiMaggio’s (1988) seminal deﬁ niti on, actors are more likely to engage in insti tuti onal entrepreneurship when 
they have an interest in creati ng an alternati ve insti tuti onal order. This moti vati on can be material or ideological (Colo-
my, 1998). In contrast to Greenwood and Suddaby’s (2006: 28) suggesti on that insti tuti onal entrepreneurs are “interest-
driven, aware and calculati ve,” Bati llana (2006) suggests that actors may also change the insti tuti onal environment and 
thus act as insti tuti onal entrepreneurs unknowingly and even unwillingly.
Insti tuti onal entrepreneurs also need parti cular skills to work for change: social skills to induce cooperati on among 
organizati ons (Fligstein, 1997); politi cal skills to negoti ate, bargain and engage in the horse trading necessary to sustain 
cooperati on in an industry (e.g., Garud, Jain, & Kumaraswamy, 2002; Maguire et al., 2004); rhetorical skills to produce 
“convincing texts that become part of central and enduring discourses in the ﬁ eld” (Phillips, Lawrence, & Hardy, 2004: 
648); and commercial skills (Phillips & Tracey, 2007). Whether insti tuti onal entrepreneurs’ calls for change resonate in 
the industry, however, also depends on the existence of ‘politi cal opportuniti es’ (Rao & Giorgi, 2006; Rao, Morrill & Zald, 
2000) or for that matt er macro level ‘cultural opportuniti es’ (Lawrence & Phillips, 2004).
3.3 What acti viti es comprise insti tuti onal entrepreneurship?
To succeed, insti tuti onal entrepreneurs must mobilize “suﬃ  cient resources” around their change project (DiMaggio, 1988: 
14). That is, they need to acquire material and cultural resources, power and legiti macy necessary to enlist support for 
their change project and prevent resistance against it. Insti tuti onal entrepreneurs engage in diﬀ erent acti viti es to do so. 
10 •• The Partnerships Resource Centre - Working paper 009
Insti tuti ons, Partnerships and Insti tuti onal change:  Towards a theoreti cal framework
Discursive acti viti es. Among the modes of acti on used by insti tuti onal entrepreneurs, the most studied appears to be 
the discursive acti viti es by which these entrepreneurs att empt to enroll others in their change project. Such discourse 
not only provides a moti vati ng frame and collecti ve identi ty (Fligstein, 1997), it also presents the issues and problems in
such way that they align with stakeholder’ interests and values (Maguire et al., 2004; Rao et al., 2000) and theorizes 
about soluti ons (Greenwood et al., 2002; Maguire et al., 2004). 
Politi cal acti viti es. Insti tuti onal entrepreneurs are not merely rhetoricians. To mobilize ﬁ eld actors to cooperate and to 
sustain cooperati on, they must also engage in politi cal acti viti es (Garud et al., 2002; Maguire et al., 2004). Thus, bargain-
ing and brokering, allying, oﬀ ering incenti ves and a diversity of ‘behind the scene’ acti ons may be producti ve in convinc-
ing stakeholders that the insti tuti onal project is in their interest (Fligstein, 1997). 
Relati onal acti viti es. Insti tuti onal entrepreneurs can jump start change processes by setti  ng up collaborati ons, coaliti ons 
and alliances (Dorado, 2005; Lawrence et al., 2002; Wijen & Ansari, 2007). The work of Lawrence et al. (2002) is parti cu-
larly interesti ng in the context of partnership research. Their case study of an NGO suggests that ill-resourced, fringe 
organizati ons can sti ll initi ate change by collaborati ng with others. Collaborati ons that are highly embedded in the insti -
tuti onal environment and consist of highly committ ed parti cipants are more likely to contribute to insti tuti onal change.
Regulati ve acti viti es. In other cases, however, insti tuti onal entrepreneurs may act more restricti vely by deciding on the 
deﬁ niti on and meaning of an insti tuti onal community‘s membership rules and the establishment of technical, legal or 
market standards that deﬁ ne the ‘normal’ processes involved in the producti on of some good or service (Lawrence, 
1999). New practi ces may also be imposed from the top by, for instance, governmental bodies (Strang & Sine, 2002; 
Reay & Hinings, 2005).
Entrepreneurial acti viti es. Finally, actors may exploit commercial acti viti es and in so doing contribute to the emergence 
of new industries. For instance, Lawrence and Phillips (2004) describe how the decisions by one entrepreneur signiﬁ -
cantly shaped the evoluti on of commercial whale-watching in Canada. Other studies also support the pivotal role of 
insti tuti onal entrepreneurship in the emergence of the industry of forensic accounti ng (Lawrence, 1999) and socially 
responsible investments (Déjean, Gond & Leca, 2004; Louche, 2004).
3.4 What are the consequences of insti tuti onal entrepreneurship?
As the concept of insti tuti onal entrepreneurship implies, insti tuti onal entrepreneurs aﬀ ect insti tuti ons. For instance, 
they may change the practi ces in an industry (Lounsbury & Crumley, 2007), the identi ti es of actors in an industry (Rao, 
Monin & Durand, 2003), the jurisdicti ons of professions (Greenwood, Hinings & Suddaby, 2002) and the patt erns of 
interacti on among industry members (Hoﬀ man, 1999; Maguire et al., 2004). Although most studies of insti tuti onal 
entrepreneurship are based on successful cases, recent studies call att enti on to both failed att empts at change (e.g., 
Greenwood & Syddaby, 2006) and the ‘dark side’ of successful change projects. An example of the latt er is collecti ve 
acti on by ﬁ rms to combat child labor in the soccer ball manufacturing industry, which were considered to be successful 
CSR acti viti es. Nevertheless, these acti ons led to negati ve impacts for local communiti es in Pakistan (Khan et al., 2007).
4. Cultural theory and value chain partnerships
Partnerships that originate in the domain of value chains represent an interesti ng combinati on of organizati onal acti v-
ity functi onal to producti on and marketi ng, arrangements between insti tuti onally or spati ally remote partners, and a 
locally embedded socio-politi cal coaliti on that engineers the politi cal and organisati onal features of integrati on and co-
operati on (Vellema, 2005; MacKenzie 1992). Here, we focus on partnerships as a new social arrangement, with a disti nct 
emerging dynamic and reﬂ ecti ng a mixture of how actors agree to cooperate and to deal with risks. On the one hand, 
a partnership is deﬁ ned by its task and relates to the environment through this task (McFeat, 1974), and, on the other 
hand, it is deﬁ ned and shaped by the inclusion of social arrangement and insti tuti onal modaliti es available in its environ-
ment. The internal dynamics and viability of partnerships are seen as a result of the combinati on of diﬀ erent insti tuti onal 
modaliti es, present in the context and crossing the boundaries of the partnership. The combinati on of insti tuti onal mo-
daliti es shapes an evolving hybrid conﬁ gurati on, which can be undermined by an exclusive focus on management styles 
and world views associated with a single insti tuti onal modality. The eﬀ ecti veness of partnerships to direct and enable 
insti tuti onal change is a resultant of its capacity to commensurate diﬀ erent insti tuti onal modaliti es in a viable conﬁ gura-
ti on anchoring performance of its functi on in a speciﬁ c locality. What needs to be explained is how a partnership, with 
a new functi onality, is able to combine its performance with insti tuti onal modaliti es in its surroundings, and how the 
evolving structure and culture of a functi onally deﬁ ned partnership feeds back into the insti tuti onal modaliti es.
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This perspecti ve on partnerships focuses att enti on on agency and aims to explain the variety of relati onships. Obviously, 
actors have diﬀ erent appraisals of how to act, and, consequently, how to see the relati on with and their dependence on 
(internati onal) business, NGOs and global value chains. The aim of this framework is to discover what happens inside the 
partnership organisati on from the assumpti on that this needs to be explained from its embedding in a wider social fabric 
that selects and regulates acti viti es and functi ons of the partnership. What needs to be explained is how people agree 
to work together, interact so as to concentrate on improving performance or on eﬀ ecti ve interventi ons, and, for the 
ti me being, ignore most of the potenti al dangers and uncertainti es that surround them (Douglas and Wildavsky 1982: 9).
4.1 Cultural theory
This secti on uses neo-Durkheimian cultural theory as a heuristi c device for mapping the insti tuti onal modaliti es in value 
chain-based partnerships. Neo-Durkheimian cultural theory, or grid-group theory (Douglas 1987, 1996), oﬀ ers a straight-
forward framework to categorize organisati onal and social behaviour. Essenti ally, grid-group theory disti nguishes four 
social formati ons or insti tuti onal orders as the social and cultural context of individual behaviour. These formati ons are 
constructed by measuring both diﬀ erent types of individual and collecti ve responses to incorporati on (social involve-
ment or group) and impositi on (regulati on or grid) (Thompson et al. 1990). The group and grid dimensions can be either 
strong or weak. For example, a hierarchical formati on represents both high levels of integrati on and rule-based behav-
iour. Grid-group theory substanti ates various modes of social order, and presents limits and organizati onal constraints 
within which the individual can move. A partnership may combine diﬀ erent degrees of collecti vism and individualism, 
and contain diﬀ erent levels of freedom to make individual choices. It also reﬂ ects the experience of belonging to a social 
organisati on, and of social diﬀ erenti ati on within and between organisati ons (Rayner 1992). Furthermore, as clariﬁ ed by 
Hood (2000: 24), it brings out some of the varying and contradictory atti  tudes about who to blame, how to assess risks 
or how to put matt ers right. The insti tuti onal modaliti es are not meant to categorize actors, but to pinpoint conﬂ icti ng 
processes, arrangements and percepti ons that encompass partnerships.
Cultural theory makes it possible to see the strategizing of partners against their organisati onal acti viti es and insti tu-
ti onally imposed roles. The work of Hood (1996, 2000) and Mars (1982), both grounded in cultural theory, help to map 
divergent problem deﬁ niti ons and conﬂ icti ng perspecti ves, as well as varieti es of acti ons and negoti ati ons in layered and 
bureaucrati c organisati ons. They discuss behavioural responses to integrati on and impositi on, and relate these respons-
es to the cohesion of groups acti ng in an insti tuti onal context. An essenti alist view on the social positi on of partners does 
not help understand the realiti es of partnerships.
The following describes a variety of ways in which groups come and hold together; such as accounti ng for acti ons, loyalty 
to an organisati on, social responsibility, and trust in the competence of others. The four cultural biases disti nguished 
by a neo-Durkheimian perspecti ve are summarised in table 1. This table ﬂ ags the existence of various perspecti ves on 
incorporati on into a bounded social group, and it suggests various responses to the impositi on of rules and conventi ons. 
It is important to realise that these perspecti ves do not necessarily coincide with speciﬁ c and bounded actors groups.
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Table 1: Dimensions of and responses to incorporati on and impositi on in partnerships
(A summary of neo-Durkheimian cultural theory)
Source: Vellema, 2002, drawing on Hood (1996, 2000), Mars (1982), Douglas (1987).
Note: The verti cal grid-axis represents the degree to which life and behaviour of individuals is circumscribed by conventi ons and rules or by externally 
imposed prescripti ons; it reﬂ ects the extent to which space for individual negoti ati ons is reduced. The horizontal group-axis represents the degree to 
which individual choice is constrained by group choice; it reﬂ ects the extent to which an individual’s life is circumscribed by the noti on of solidarity of 
the group he or she belongs to.
4.2 Organisati onal variety: unpacking the hybrid nature of partnership
Partnerships can best be understood as an evolving insti tuti onal arrangement, which engineers both the politi cal and 
organisati onal features of integrati on and cooperati on. The aim of a cultural theory perspecti ve is to explore the under-
lying patt erns of control and regulati on, and, to discuss the partnership’s managerial capacity to respond to failure (cf. 
Hood 2000). The type of approach adopted by a partnership to solve newly arising problems is largely dependent on 
existi ng thought-styles about co-operati on and regulati on inside the company (cf. Douglas 1987, 1996). The theoreti cal 
orientati on in this secti on helps to describe the messy mixture of insti tuti onal modaliti es as an unintended outcome of 
how partnership arrangements are embedded in local societi es; rather than as an intenti onal nurturing of diﬀ erent insti -
tuti onal cultures. The framework proposes to consider four modaliti es of control and regulati on as interdependent social 
practi ces receiving variable emphasis during the evoluti on of value chain partnerships. Four cultural biases, situated in 
social relati ons and organisati onal backgrounds, seem to capture the diﬀ erent insti tuti onal perspecti ves, or modes of 
social engagement:
• Fatalist culture  Contrived randomness and reciprocity
• Hierarchical culture  Administrati ve control and transparency
• Individualisti c culture  Entrepreneurial partnership and performance
• Enclavist/egalitarian culture  Brokerage, delegated negoti ati on and obstructi on
In this approach, the internal level of organisati on is presented as a product of circumstance (Douglas et al. 1998). The 
resulti ng organisati onal variety allows partners to pick a form of interacti on that suits their current interests. As a con-
sequence, partnerships may entail a lot of strategizing, as well as numerous collisions between divergent percepti ons 
on the actual content of the social relati onship. The insti tuti on of partnerships is an unspeciﬁ ed mixture of coercion and 
Fatalist culture
Contrived randomness and reciprocity
• Acceptance of uncertain procedures and
 unpredictable rewards;
• Strati ﬁ ed individuals alive at margins of
 organisati onal patt erns;
• Individual bargaining outside formal reward
 system and exploit personalised relati onships
 in situati on of limited choice;
• Permanently failing organisati ons and
 percepti on that economic survival is not
 linked to performance;
• Minimum anti cipati on and lack of dispositi on
 to take responsibility: ad-hoc responses to 
 events.
Hierarchical culture
Administrati ve control and transparency
• Elaborate organisati onal apparatus of controllers
 and overseers at all levels of the organisati on;
 greater managerial grip;
• Division of labour and diﬀ erenti ated roles;
 conﬁ dence in organisati onal competence;
• Excessive trust in technical experti se and ti ght
 bureaucrati c procedures;
• Binding prescripti on and inability to learn; error
 inducing organisati on;
• Fairness consists of equality before the law;
 conceal evidence of failure.
Enclavist or egalitarian culture
Brokerage, delegated negoti ati on and obstructi on
• Failing negoti ati on and unwillingness to accept
 higher authority to break deadlocks; lack of ability
 to resolve disputes and feuds;
• Sending a delegate as negoti ator; strong relati ons
 between group members;
• Shared oppositi on to outside world keeps group
 bounded together;
• Respond collecti vely to opportuniti es provided 
 by company;
• Clash of cultures; close territories and put blame
 on the system.
Individualisti c culture
Entrepreneurial partnership and performance
by competi ti ve individuals
• Freedom to enter and to exit transacti ons;
• Relati onship is subject to negoti ati on and
 dependent on the ability of individuals to
 shape their work as they choose;
• Boundaries are provisional and failure stems
 from lack of co-operati on;
• Unchecked private gain at the expense of
 what is supposed to be a collecti ve
 enterprise;
• Pursuit of personal rewards; dependent on eﬀ ort.
Group
Grid
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control, of persuasion and conventi ons, and of converging self-interests. A task of research, proposed by cultural theory, 
is to picture the extent to which such a hybrid insti tuti onal complex is able to regulate organisati onal life. Correspond-
ingly, it raises the questi on what happens if insti tuti onal percepti ons are incommensurable (Richards, 2005)?
Hood (1996) interprets hybridity in real organisati onal architectures as a reacti on to the limitati ons of typical forms of 
control, speciﬁ cally those based either in hierarchical relati onships or in individualisti c relati onships. This is a central to 
any insti tuti onal analysis grounded in cultural theory, as Hood (2000: 11) writes:
“ Cultural theorists are not the ﬁ rst to have noti ced that in matt ers of organizati on and management, we tend to formu-
late ideas about reform through a process of reacti on against what we see as an unsati sfactory status quo, rather than 
beginning the process of insti tuti onal design from a genuinely ‘zero base’. But that observati on is central to their ideas 
about what sustains organizati onal variety. ”
The more reliance is placed on one organisati onal recipe, the more likely such a decision will give rise to resistance from 
those who have alternati ve preferences about how to organise contract growing (Hood 2000). Apparently, sustainability 
of the organisati on strongly relies on the eﬃ  cacy of available forms of governance in handling unexpected events.
The hypothesis investi gated here is that co-operati on essenti ally depends on a capability to incorporate divergent inter-
ests and variant cultural noti ons of solidarity into one organisati onal framework, parti ally functi onal to producti on and 
marketi ng. Neo-Durkheimian cultural theory can be used as a heuristi c device for mapping the diverse organisati onal 
formati ons wherein partners interact, and for describing the evolving managerial, administrati ve and working relati ons 
in a partnership. Such an exercise results in a characterisati on of organisati onal cultures specifying the hybrid nature 
of partnership arrangements. This outcome underscores the prominent role of divergent opinions and percepti ons on 
mutuality in a partnership relati onship and, correspondingly, the existence of an array of management practi ces.
4.3 Management and sustainability of hybrid organisati onal structures1
Hypotheti cally, a partnership can be a robust organisati onal form because it is able to incorporate cultural and organisa-
ti onal diversity into its consti tuti on, even though this is not the way in which the scheme is supposed to work. Partner-
ships may choose from a variety of management styles and organisati onal models. Disappointment over the capacity 
of one approach to deliver sati sfactory results, leads to increasing support for one of the other opti ons. Moreover, in 
problemati c situati ons they may opt for extreme measures, such as imposing hierarchy or pure business deals, which 
rule out the culti vated mixture of cultural noti ons and social frameworks att ached to partnerships in the beginning 
(Hood 1996: 221). Local actors, of course, will not readily accept the organisati onal visions accompanying interventi ons 
following from this search for managerial recipes. For example, an increased emphasis on either hierarchical control or 
individualist performance may become incommensurable with more personalized, reciprocal and culturally sensiti ve re-
lati onships. Yet, in cases of failure, managers may be inclined to turn to a conﬁ ned set of instruments, while the range of 
existi ng social practi ces in partnerships entails a much wider set of organisati onal relati ons. The adopted managerial ap-
proach may clash with the various cultural noti ons existent in organisati ons and communiti es aligned to the partnership.
An insti tuti onal analysis of partnership relati ons, using a scheme from neo-Durkheimian cultural theory as heuristi c, 
goes beyond the obvious dichotomy between hierarchy and individualism (Thompson et al. 1990; Dent and Ezzamel 
1995). The insti tuti onal variety found in partnerships suggests that such cooperati ve arrangements are more than a 
simple binary insti tuti onal conﬁ gurati on between market individualism and imposed hierarchy. Pursuing only these nar-
rowly deﬁ ned opti ons may result in error-inducing organisati ons lacking incenti ves to learn, due to their conﬁ ned capac-
ity to respond to ﬁ nancial pressures and producti on problems, or to social resistance and communicati on diﬃ  culti es 
(Perrow 1984).
Perri 6 (2003) elaborates on the questi on how a cultural theory framework can help to identi fy under what conditi ons 
insti tuti ons, policies and arrangement are viable. He argues that insti tuti ons, policies and arrangements have the great-
est chance of viability when they exhibit suﬃ  cient internal variety of the basic insti tuti onal forms, and when conﬂ icts 
between these forms can be contained by one or more types of sett lements. Perri 6 deﬁ nes viability as the capability 
of an empirical insti tuti on, or a set of empirical insti tuti ons, for being sustained within its environment, despite a wide 
range of external pressures and internal tensions short of force majeure so great that no set of insti tuti ons could be vi-
able against it (the robustness conditi ons), albeit (if necessary) with some changes to that setoﬀ  insti tuti ons, but where 
those changes are such that most people would consider it to represent the conti nuity of substanti ally the same
set of insti tuti ons. 
1 The discussion in this secti on builds on earlier research on contract farming, which is considered to be a
speciﬁ c manifestati on of a value chain-based partnership (Vellema, 2002)
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All insti tuti ons are vulnerable to pressures or shocks, but some are clearly more viable than others (6, 2003: 398). 
Viability becomes a functi on of the nature of the balance between diﬀ erent basic kinds of feedback in a social system, 
e.g. negoti ati on processes or accommodati on of conﬂ icts in a partnership. Each organizati on can balance itself, but be-
yond that point, feedback between solidariti es can go to the extremes and lead to disorganizati on, as was also pointed 
out by Hood (1996; 2000). Perri 6 perceives viability as an outcome of sett lements between four disti nct solidariti es or 
insti tuti onal modaliti es. Sett lements are fragile and prone to failure. If we understand more about the viability of insti tu-
ti ons, it might also be possible to engage in more intelligent insti tuti onal craft ing to enhance the viability of sett lements.
Perri 6 combines neo-Durkheimian cultural theory with an interest in system dynamics by looking at positi ve, or self-
reinforcing feedback mechanisms and at negati ve, or correcti ng, feedback mechanisms operati onal between the soli-
dariti es described by cultural theory. Neo- Durkheimian cultural theory situates insti tuti onal failure in a stati c context, 
providing a taxonomy of insti tuti onal modaliti es with speciﬁ c strengths and weaknesses for their viability. A crucial 
thesis following from this is that the interacti ons between these four basic solidariti es produce a non-linear disequilib-
rium system. Two basic forces, namely positi ve and negati ve feedback can be used to understand the viability of such a 
system. Positi ve feedback is about reinforcing characteristi cs, for example processes of organizati onal learning or path 
dependence in technology development. But it can also refer to vicious cycles eventually undermining the insti tuti on. 
By contrast, negati ve feedback is the phenomenon of resistance or correcti ve measures. A thesis derived from the neo-
Durkheimian model is that solidariti es as insti tuti ons tend to reinforce themselves and come into conﬂ ict in ways that 
structure parti cular empirical processes of historical change. Uncontrolled forms of positi ve or negati ve feedback can be
sources of insti tuti onal failure. Both feedback processes are ulti mately derived from the same underlying dynamic of 
insti tuti onal self-asserti on in reacti on to the asserti on of other insti tuti ons.
Perri 6 (2003) has an interest in cohesion, deﬁ ned as the degree to which insti tuti onal sett lements based on negati ve 
feedback is able to constrain conﬂ icts with other solidariti es. In order to constrain conﬂ ict or tension, any arrangements 
between insti tuti onal modaliti es must take the form of a ‘sett lement’. A sett lement is some social or politi cal accom-
modati on, some pragmati c way of giving structure to co-existence, and therefore some way of limiti ng the aspirati ons to 
consistency and completeness for insti tuti ons of accountability. 
Four types of sett lement are disti nguished by 6 (2003: 404-409):
• tolerati on of a speciﬁ c insti tuti on – no solidarity vetoes or acti vely undermines another;
• separati on or conti ngency – establishment of insti tuti ons that allow more or less disti nct sectors with a local 
 hegemony; for example, each form of social organisati on is selected because of its appropriateness for a parti cular 
 task or technology;
• exchange or mutual dependency – insti tuti onalisati on of reciprocal support, which is a feature of many complex 
 organizati ons;
• compromise or hybridity – acceptance of constraints in making claims, usually involving a four-way hybrid that 
 recognises diﬀ erences, and with capaciti es to shift  between modaliti es.
For Perri 6 the key to insti tuti onal viability consists of att empts to insti tuti onalise some kind or kinds of sett lement be-
tween the forces of positi ve and negati ve feedback, which gives them some space to operate (social systems are inher-
ently dynamic and in disequilibrium, and cannot be made stati c), but which moderates both the violence of their own 
oscillati ons and of their destructi ve dynamics and of their encounter with each other. This introduces the feature known
in system theory as requisite variety. Excluding solidariti es would provoke counter-asserti on; a viable and consistent 
social system gives arti culati on to all four social solidariti es. Cohesion in a system is achievable when modaliti es have a 
moderati ng eﬀ ect on others. A vital insti tuti on exhibits suﬃ  cient internal variety or external similarity. Viability is a func-
ti on of the nature of the balance of diﬀ erent kinds of feedback operati ve in a social system.
Inter-organizati onal or cross-functi onal teams or alliances can be expected to play a vital role in the desired improvement 
process towards sustainability. Perri 6 emphasises that sett lements between solidariti es are crucial for making insti tuti onal 
arrangements coherent and work towards a common goal. Therefore, it seems wise to realise that partnerships include a 
social sett lement between insti tuti onal modaliti es and that speciﬁ c measures may be needed to avoid insti tuti onal failure. 
The aim of insti tuti onal craft ing then is to try to compensate for as many of the organisati onal weaknesses of each of the 
solidariti es at once, whilst recognising the inevitable instability of insti tuti onal arrangements that att empt this.
The challenge is not an opti misati on problem but a coping problem. Insti tuti ons change in response to the unintended 
consequences of deliberate att empts to craft  their characteristi cs. It seems worthwhile to develop theoreti cal models 
that help to foresee the consequences of such acti on with reasonable levels of conﬁ dence. This provides an alternati ve 
for theoreti cal models that celebrate single kinds of insti tuti ons (“more markets” or “more associati ons”) rather than 
explain insti tuti onal failures.
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5. Discussion
In this paper we explore the theoreti cal foundati ons for research of the Partnerships Resource Centre in (global) value 
chains trajectory. Partnerships are unique due to case speciﬁ c compositi on and functi on, and the outcomes of partner-
ships are highly conti ngent on context. This makes it diﬃ  cult to generalize about what partnerships are and what they 
do. Usually, researches on partnerships are case studies, with a strong focus on ti me and place speciﬁ c events and real 
life situati ons. Theory-laden investi gati on is a methodological answer to the dilemma of case study research and it 
enables the black box of partnerships to be opened by focusing att enti on on mechanisms, with causal properti es, that 
produce insti tuti onal change.
Three related approaches in insti tuti onal theory are reviewed to identi fy their potenti al for explaining changes in the insti -
tuti onal environment of value chains brought about by partnerships. The ﬁ rst approach comprises organizati onal theory 
and compliance theory. Even though the value chain track focuses on market insti tuti ons that facilitate inclusion in value 
chains, we locate our research in the organizati onal theory rather than in the stream of new insti tuti onal economics, be-
cause it is equipped to analyse the process of change of such insti tuti ons. Our assumpti ons largely ﬁ t the ‘old’ insti tuti onal-
ism traditi on that explicitly takes into account the role of interest diﬀ erences and conﬂ ict as inﬂ uenti al factors in insti tu-
ti onal change. Compliance theory in parti cular seems promising for analysing the eﬀ ecti veness of value chain partnerships 
inducing processes changing market insti tuti ons either verti cally (through quality standards) or horizontally in a parti cular 
geographic locati on. At least for the verti cal approach, we have been able to do the groundwork for the development of 
some propositi ons about the eﬀ ecti veness of changes in market insti tuti ons along the global value chain.
The second approach discusses the theoreti cally and empirically rich body of work on insti tuti onal entrepreneurship 
that holds promise for studying value chain partnerships in emerging economies for three reasons. First, the concept of 
insti tuti onal entrepreneurship calls att enti on to the wider insti tuti onal environment in which partnerships are embed-
ded. Partnerships may aﬀ ect this environment. For instance, a partnership may fail to achieve its goals to change market 
rules to the beneﬁ t of a parti cular farmer group, yet may sti ll insti gate change by contributi ng to the macro-cultural dis-
course in a country, upon which other insti tuti onal entrepreneurs act. Conversely, insti tuti onal environments may also 
aﬀ ect partnerships. Comparable partnerships may, for example, produce diﬀ erent results because the opportunity struc-
tures of the industries in which they operate vary. Knowing under which conditi ons partnerships may be eﬀ ecti ve, helps 
practi ti oners in their decision-making process about the questi on whether or not to launch value chain partnerships.
Second, insti tuti onal entrepreneurship literature shift s att enti on to the role of actors other than the ones involved in the 
partnership itself. That is, insti tuti onal entrepreneurs need ‘subsidiary actors’ (DiMaggio, 1988: 15) who support them in 
their acti viti es. In the case of climate change negoti ati ons, Wijen and Ansari (2007: 1091) suggest that media coverage 
was key to the success of the collaborati on on climate change, because it was felt that “the whole world was watching 
and that the negoti ati ons could consequently not fail.” Accordingly, research into the role of actors backing partnerships 
would generate useful insights for the organizati ons managing partnerships.
Finally, the recent att enti on within insti tuti onal entrepreneurship research for the ‘dark side’ of successful change oﬀ ers 
potenti ally rich insights into partnerships. Given that such ‘dark sides’ are also evident in value chains (e.g., the introducti on 
of new quality standards may include some farmers, but exclude others), research in this area could contribute to the devel-
opment of a ‘value chain interventi on assessment’ (VCIA) tool similar to the environmental impact assessment (EIA) tool.
The third approach we discussed concerns cultural theory, and parti cularly grid-group theory, to explore concepts that 
can be used in examining the internal factors and processes that inﬂ uence the sustainability and eﬀ ecti veness of part-
nerships. Analysis of partnerships must be able to make a precise insti tuti onal and social analysis of the distributi on of 
eﬃ  ciency gains and rewards, the type of working relati ons, the functi oning of diﬀ erent task groups, and performance of 
technologies. Consequently, the purpose of a study based on neo-Durkheimian cultural theory, is to ﬁ ll the gap left  by 
insti tuti onal economists, pointed out by Mary Douglas (1987: 111-112, 124):
“ Insti tuti onal economics suggests why a parti cular insti tuti onal form makes more sense to rati onal individuals in one 
economic environment rather than another. It does not explain the process by which the insti tuti on keeps itself and the 
environment stable enough to be recognized by the individual making a rati onal choice [. .] The most profound decisions 
about justi ce are not made by individuals as such, but by individuals thinking within and on behalf of insti tuti ons. ”
The premise of such a study is that values are systemati cally related to organisati onal acti vity (Richards, 2005). Concrete 
organisati onal acti viti es, such as accounti ng, management or decision making embody insti tuti onal values: insti tuti onal 
modaliti es that select or silence organisati onal and technological opti ons by determining what possibility looks feasible 
(Douglas et al. 1998). Partnership managers may opt for congenial soluti ons rather than more stressful and ‘nitt ygritt y’
operati ons in diﬃ  cult social environments (Hood 2000). Withdrawing from social issues inside and outside the bounda-
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ries of a partnership may look convenient, but without ﬁ ne-tuning with society partnerships will not work. Economy 
and performance are inseparable from other areas of social life, and consequently, a value chain partnership has to deal 
with the details of social domains. An exclusive emphasis on technical and rati onal behaviour denies the social origin of 
co-ordinati on procedures and policing mechanisms in a division of labour (cf. Douglas 1987) and, eventually, may erode 
the social cohesion of partnerships.
6. Conclusion
The three theoreti cal approaches use disti nct perspecti ves on insti tuti ons with a focus on variety, constraints and pre-
scripti ons, and malleability respecti vely. They are middle-range theories, a concept coined by Merton in the 1950s, with 
limited scope, which explain a speciﬁ c set of phenomena, as opposed to a grand theory that seeks to explain phenomena 
at a societal level. The three explanati ons allow a focus on interesti ng, puzzling, socially signiﬁ cant outcome patt erns 
(Pawson 2000), namely (durable) insti tuti onal change resulti ng from newly formed partnerships functi onal to marketi ng 
and producti on in value chains. They provide the basis for theory-driven empirical inquiry.
The three approaches can be jointly applied in formulati ng researchable, alternati ve hypotheses. It sketches a perspec-
ti ve on how to consolidate within a network of (possibly rival) theories. In a follow up of this theoreti cal excursion, we 
aim to confederate empirical inquiry with this network of middle range theories and to work with a limited set of suf-
ﬁ ciently abstract assumpti ons. This makes it possible to borrow, consolidate, and pass on explanatory structures and 
to relate a set of statements or hypotheses to segregated observati ons. This way of middlerange thinking encourages 
making the step from describing regulariti es or outcomes to their explanati on and to develop special theories applicable 
to limited conceptual range and beyond speciﬁ c descripti ve categories, such as partnerships.
We expect that through theoreti cal triangulati on, i.e. putti  ng alternati ve theories against the same body of data (Denzin 
1970), we will be able to achieve the right blend between theory and empirical research necessary for getti  ng inside the 
box of causati on, i.e. the mechanisms in partnerships producing insti tuti onal change. We see mechanisms as pathways 
of processes by which an eﬀ ect is produced or a purpose is accomplished (Gerring 2007). Theory-laden investi gati on is 
needed to discover the mechanisms, with causal powers and liabiliti es, at work. Causal process tracing methodology (6, 
2008; Blatt er and Blumme, 2008) is tailored to case study research and to cross-case analysis and aims to establish a 
set of contextualised relati onships between a range of hypothesised (or candidate) causal process mechanisms. In our 
study of partnerships, we try to arrive at conti ngent generalisati ons. Therefore, we have to ﬁ nd a way of incorporati ng 
theory-driven expectati ons, and to allow competi ng candidate mechanisms to be assessed in relati on to data concern-
ing the mechanisms themselves, and concerning context and outcomes, and to permit new and unexpected ﬁ ndings to 
challenge assumpti ons (6, 2008). In this way, the theoreti cal frameworks discussed in this paper can be combined with 
deducti ve inferences and encourage counter-hypotheti cal reasoning. The three frameworks inform the ways in which 
causal inferences are drawn for cases under study and to scruti nize the diﬀ erent understandings and directi ons of gen-
eralizati on within these three approaches.
References
6, P., 2003. Insti tuti onal viability: a neo-Durkheimian theory. Innovati on, the European Journal ofSocial Science 
 Research 16(4): 395-415.
6, P. 2008. Causal process tracing in social science research design, unpublished typescript. Notti  ngham Trent University.
Batti  lana, J. 2006. Agency and insti tuti ons: The enabling role of individuals’ social positi on. Organizati on, 13(5): 653-676.
Bitzer, V, van Wijk, J., Helmsing, B., van der Linden, V. (2011). Partnering to facilitate smallholder inclusion in value chains.
 In: B. Helmsing and S. Vellema, Value Chains, Inclusion and Endogenous Development. Contrasti ng Theories
 and Realiti es. Routledge.
Blatt er, J. & Blume, T. 2008. In Search of Co-variance, Causal Mechanisms or Congruence? Towards a Plural Understand-
 ing of Case Studies. Swiss Politi cal Science Review, 14, 315-356.
Börzel, T. 2000. Private Actors on The Rise? The Role of Non-State Actors in Compliance with Internati onal Insti tuti ons. Pre-
 prints from the Max-Planck-Projektgruppe Recht der Gemeinschaft sgüter 2000/14, Max Planck Insti tute, Bonn.
17 •• The Partnerships Resource Centre - Working paper 009
Insti tuti ons, Partnerships and Insti tuti onal change:  Towards a theoreti cal framework
Carothers, T. 1998. The Rule of Law Revival. Foreign Aﬀ airs, 77 (2).
Chang, H.J. 2002. Breaking the Mould - An Insti tuti onalist Politi cal Economy Alternati ve to the Neo-Liberal Theory of the
 Market and the State. Cambridge Journal of Economics, 26 (5): 539-559.
Chayes, A. and Chayes, A.H. 1993. On Compliance. Internati onal Organizati on, 47(2): 175-205.
Child, J., Lu, Y., & Tsai, T. 2007. Insti tuti onal entrepreneurship in building an environmental protecti on system for the
 People’s Republic of China. Organizati on Studies, 28(7): 1013-1034.
Colomy, P. 1998. Neofuncti onalism and neoinsti tuti onalism: Human agency and interest in insti tuti onal change. 
 Sociological Forum, 13(2): 265-300.
Coombs, R., P. Saviotti  , V. Walsh 1992. Technology and the ﬁ rm: The convergence of economic and sociological 
 approaches? In: Coombs, P. Saviotti  , V. Walsh (eds), Technological change and company strategies. 
 London: Academic press: 1-24.
Coombs, R, S. Metcalfe 1998. Distributed Capabiliti es and the Governance of the Firm. CRIC Discussion Paper, no.16.
Déjean, F., Gond, J.P., & Leca, B. 2004. Measuring the unmeasured: An insti tuti onal entrepreneur strategy in an emerging
 industry. Human Relati ons, 57(6): 741-764.
Dent, J. and M. Ezzamel 1995. Organisati onal control and management accounti ng. In: J. Holloway, J. Lewis and 
 G. Mallory (eds), Performance measurement and evaluati on. London: Sage Publicati ons/Open University:
 p.15-44.
Denzin, N.K. 1970. The research act: A theoreti cal introducti on to sociological methods. Chicago: Aldine.
DiMaggio, P. 1988. Interest and agency in insti tuti onal theory. In L.G. Zucker (Ed.), Insti tuti onal patt erns and organi-
 zati ons: Culture and environment: 3-22. Cambridge, MA: Ballinger.
Dorado, S. 2005. Insti tuti onal entrepreneurship, partaking, and convening. Organizati on Studies, 26(3): 385-414.
Douglas, M. 1987. How insti tuti ons think. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
Douglas, M. 1996. Thought styles: criti cal essays on good taste. London: Sage.
Douglas, M., A. Wildavsky 1982. Risk and Culture: An Essay on the Selecti on of Technical and Environmental Dangers.
 Berkeley: University of California Press.
Douglas, M., D. Gasper, S. Ney, M. Tompson 1998. Human needs and wants. In: S. Rayner, E.L. Malone (eds), Human
 choice and climate change: Volume 1 The societal framework. Columbus, Ohio: Batt elle Press: 195-264.
Downs, G., Rocke, D., Barsoom, P. (1996). Is the Good News about Compliance Good News about Cooperati on? 
 Internati onal Organizati on, 50(3): 379-406.
ECSAD (2009). Resource Centre Development Partnerships. Proposal for the initi ati on of a Research and Learning 
 Network. 15 July 2009.
Faure, M., Lefevere, J. (1999). Compliance with Internati onal Environmental Agreements. In: N.J. Vig and R.S. Axelrod
 (Eds) Global Environment: Insti tuti ons, Law, and Policy. Earthscan Publicati ons Ltd., London, UK: 138-156.
Fligstein, N. 1997. Social skill and insti tuti onal theory. American Behavioral Scienti st, 40(4): 397-405.
Garud, R., Jain, S., & Kumaraswamy, A. 2002. Insti tuti onal entrepreneurship in the sponsorship of common technological 
 standards: The case of Sun Microsystems and Java. Academy of Management Journal, 45(1): 196-214.
Gerring, J. 2007. The Mechanismic Worldview: Thinking Inside the Box. Briti sh Journal of Politi cal Science, 38, 161-179.
Gibbon, P. 2001. Upgrading Primary Producti on: A Global Commodity Chain Approach. World Development, 29(2): 345-363.
18 •• The Partnerships Resource Centre - Working paper 009
Insti tuti ons, Partnerships and Insti tuti onal change:  Towards a theoreti cal framework
Goodin, R. E. (ed.) (1998). The Theory of Insti tuti onal Design. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK.
Greenwood, R., Suddaby, R., & Hinings, C.R. 2002. Theorizing change: The role of professional associati ons in the trans-
 formati on of insti tuti onalized ﬁ elds. Academy of Management Journal, 45(1): 58-80.
Greenwood, R., & Suddaby, R. 2006. Insti tuti onal entrepreneurship in mature ﬁ elds: The Big Five accounti ng ﬁ rms. 
 Academy of Management Journal, 49(1): 27-48.
Grindle, M. S. 1977. Power, experti se and the “Tecnico”: Suggesti ons from a Mexican case study. The Journal of Politi cs,
 39(2): 399-426.
Hoﬀ man, A.J. 1999. Insti tuti onal evoluti on and change: Environmentalism and the US chemical industry. Academy of
 Management Journal, 42(4): 351-371.
Hood, C. 1996. Control over bureaucracy: cultural theory and insti tuti onal variety. Journal of Public Policy, 15 (3): 207-30.
Hood, C., 2000. The art of the state: culture, rhetoric and public management. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Khan, F.R., Munir, K.A., & Willmott , H. 2007. A dark side of insti tuti onal entrepreneurship: Soccer balls, child labour and
 postcolonial impoverishment. Organizati on Studies, 28(7): 1055-1077.
Kolk, A., van Tulder, R., & Kostwinder, E. 2008. Business and partnerships for development. European Management 
 Journal, 26(4): 262-273.
Lawrence, T.B. 1999. Insti tuti onal strategy. Journal of Management, 25(2): 161-188.
Lawrence, T.B., Hardy, C., & Phillips, N. 2002. Insti tuti onal eﬀ ects of interorganizati onal collaborati on: The emergence of 
 proto-insti tuti ons. Academy of Management Journal, 45(1): 281-290.
Lawrence, T.B., & Phillips, N. 2004. From Moby Dick to Free Willy: Macro-cultural discourse and insti tuti onal entre-
preneurship in emerging insti tuti onal ﬁ elds. Organizati on, 11(5): 689-711.
Lawrence, T.B., & Suddaby, R. 2006. Insti tuti ons and insti tuti onal work. In S.R. Clegg, C. Hardy, T.B. Lawrence, & W. Nord
 (Eds.), Handbook of organizati on studies, Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
Jenkins, R. (2003). Internati onal Development Insti tuti ons and Nati onal Economic Contexts: Neoliberalism Encounters 
 India’s Indigenous Politi cal Traditi ons. Economy and Society, 32(4): 584-610.
Jepperson, R.L. (1991). Insti tuti ons, Insti tuti onal Eﬀ ects, and Insti tuti onalism. In: Powell and DiMaggio, The New Insti tu-
 ti onalism in Organizati onal Analysis. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press: 143-163.
Jütti  ng, J. (2003). Insti tuti ons and Development: A criti cal review. OECD Technical Paper, No.102, OECD Development
 Centre.
Louche, C. 2004. Ethical investment. Processes and mechanisms of insti tuti onalisati on in the Netherlands, 1990 - 2002. 
 PhD dissertati on. Erasmus University Rott erdam, Rott erdam, the Netherlands.
Lounsbury, M., & Crumley, E.T. 2007. New practi ce creati on: An insti tuti onal perspecti ve on innovati on. Organizati on
 Studies, 28(7): 993-1012.
MacKenzie, D. 1992. Economic and sociological explanati ons of technical change. In: R. Coombs, P. Saviotti  , V. Walsh
 (eds), Technological change and company strategies: economic and sociological perspecti ves. 
 London: Academic Press: 25-48.
Maguire, S., Hardy, C., & Lawrence, T.B. 2004. Insti tuti onal entrepreneurship in emerging ﬁ elds: HIV/AIDS treatment 
 advocacy in Canada. Academy of Management Journal, 47(5): 657-679.
Markelova, H., Meinzen-Dick, R.S., Hellin, J. & Dohrn, S. (2009). Collecti ve acti on for smallholder market access. 
 Food Policy, 34(1):1-7
19 •• The Partnerships Resource Centre - Working paper 009
Insti tuti ons, Partnerships and Insti tuti onal change:  Towards a theoreti cal framework
Mars, G. 1982. Cheats at work: an anthropology of workplace crime. London: Unwin Paperbacks.
McDermott , G. A. 2007. The Politi cs of Insti tuti onal Renovati on and Economic Upgrading: Recombining the Vines That
 Bind in Argenti na. Politi cs Society, 35(1): 103-144.
McFeat, T. 1974. Small-group cultures. New York: Pergamon Press.
Mesquita, L. F., & Lazzarini, S. G. 2008. Horizontal and verti cal relati onships in developing economies: Implicati ons for
 SMEs access to global markets. Academy of Management Journal, 51: 359-380.
Mitchell, R. 1994b. Regime Design Matt ers: Intenti onal Oil Polluti on and Treaty Compliance, Internati onal Organizati on, 
 48(3): 425-458.
Munir, K.A., & Phillips, N. 2005. The birth of the ‘Kodak moment’: Insti tuti onal entrepreneurship and the adopti on of 
 new technologies. Organizati on Studies, 26(11): 1665-1687.
Mutch, A. 2007. Reﬂ exivity and the insti tuti onal entrepreneur: A historical explorati on. Organizati on Studies, 
 28(7): 1123-1140.
Nadvi, K. and Waltring, F. 2004. Making sense of global standards. In: H. Schmitz (ed.) Local Enterprises in the Global 
 Economy: Issues of Governance and Upgrading, Elgar, Cheltenham: 53-94.
Oﬀ e, C. 1998. Designing Insti tuti ons in East European Transiti ons. In: Goodin, Robert E. (ed), The Theory of Insti tuti onal 
 Design. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge: 199-226.
Oﬀ e, C. 1999. How Can We Trust Our Fellow Citi zens? In: M. E. Warren (ed.) Democracy and Trust. Cambridge University
 Press, Cambridge: 42-87.
Pawson, R. 2000. “Middle-range realism”. Archives Européenees de Sociologie, 41(2): 283-325.
Perrow, C. 1984. Normal accidents: living with high-risk technologies, New York: Basic Books.
Phillips, N., Lawrence, T.B., & Hardy, C. 2004. Discourse and insti tuti ons. Academy of Management Review, 29(4): 635-652.
Phillips, N., & Tracey, P. 2007. Opportunity recogniti on, entrepreneurial capabiliti es and bricolage: Connecti ng insti tu-
 ti onal theory and entrepreneurship in strategic organizati on. Strategic Organizati on, 5(3): 313-320.
Poulton, C., Kydd, J. & Dorward, A. (2006). Overcoming Market Constraints on Pro-Poor Agricultural Growth in 
 Sub-Saharan Africa. Development Policy Review, 24(3): 243-277.
Powell, W.W., DiMaggio, P.J. (eds.) 1991. The New Insti tuti onalism in Organizati onal Analysis. Chicago: The University of 
 Chicago Press.
Rao, H., Morrill, C., & Zald, M.N. 2000. Power plays: How social movements and collecti ve acti on create new organiza-
 ti onal forms. Research in Organizati onal Behavior, vol. 22: 237-281.
Rao, H., Monin, P., & Durand, R. 2003. Insti tuti onal change in Toque Ville: Nouvelle cuisine as an identi ty movement in 
 French gastronomy. American Journal of Sociology, 108(4): 795-843.
Rao, H., & Giorgi, S. 2006. Code breaking: How entrepreneurs exploit cultural logics to generate insti tuti onal change.
 Research in Organizati onal Behavior, 27: 269-304.
Rayner, S. 1992. Cultural theory and risk analysis. In: S. Krimsky, D. Golding (eds), Social Theories of Risk. 
 Westport: Praeger: 83-115.
Reay, T., & Hinings, C.R. 2005. The recompositi on of an organizati onal ﬁ eld: Health care in Alberta. Organizati on Studies,
 26(3): 351-384.
Richards, P., 2005. Can violence be managed? A neo-Durkheimian perspecti ve on resource conﬂ ict in a West African rain
 forest world. In: P. Richards (ed.), No peace, no war: learning to live with violent conﬂ ict.
20 •• The Partnerships Resource Centre - Working paper 009
Insti tuti ons, Partnerships and Insti tuti onal change:  Towards a theoreti cal framework
Thompson, M., R. Ellis, A. Wildavsky 1990. Cultural theory. Boulder: Westview Press.
Thompson, M.G., G. Grendstad, P. Selle 1999. Cultural theory as politi cal science. London: Routledge.
Scott , W. R. 1995. Insti tuti ons and Organisati ons. Sage Publicati ons, Thousand Oaks, CA, USA.
Scott , W.R. 2008. Insti tuti ons and organizati ons (3rd ed.). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
Stephenson, M. 2003. ‘The Rule of Law as a Goal of Development Policy’. Retrieved from the Website of the World Bank,
 November 2003. www1.worldbank.org/publicsector/legal/ruleoﬂ aw2.htm.
Strang, D., & Sine, W.D. 2002. Interorganizati onal insti tuti ons. In J.A.C. Baum (Ed.), Companion to organizati ons: 497-519. 
 Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
Suddaby, R., & Greenwood, R. 2005. Rhetorical strategies of legiti macy. Administrati ve Science Quarterly, 50(1): 35-67.
Tallberg, J. 2002. Paths to Compliance: Enforcement, Management, and the European Union. Internati onal Organizati on, 
 56(3): 609-643.
Van Wijk, J. and Vellema, S. 2010. Proposal for a Research Framework for the Value Chains Trajectory. Partnerships 
 Resource Centre, 24 January 2010.
Vellema, S. 2002. Making Contract Farming Work? Society and Technology in Philippine Transnati onal Agribusiness, 
 Maastricht: Shaker Publishing.
Vellema, S. 2005. Regional cultures and global sourcing of fresh asparagus. In: Fold, N, and Pritchard, B. (eds). 
 Cross-conti nental food chains: structures, actors and dynamics in the global food system. 
 London: Routledge: 124-136.
Vellema, S. (ed) (2011) Transformati on and sustainability in agriculture: Connecti ng practi ce with social theory. 
 Wageningen: Wageningen Academic Publishers.
Wijen, F., & Ansari, S. 2007. Overcoming inacti on through collecti ve insti tuti onal entrepreneurship: Insights from regime
 theory. Organizati on Studies, 28(7): 1079-1100.
Williamson, O. E. 2000. ‘The New Insti tuti onal Economics: Taking Stock, Looking Ahead.’ Journal of Economic Literature,
 38 (3): 595-613.
Wolf, S., B. Hueth, E. Ligon 2001. Policing Mechanisms in Agricultural Contracts. Rural Sociology, 66 (3).
World Bank 2002. Building Insti tuti ons for Markets. World Development Report 2002. Oxford University Press, New York.
Young, O.R. 2001.The Behavioral Eﬀ ects of Environmental Regimes: Collecti ve-Acti on vs. Social-Practi ce Models. 
 Internati onal Environmental Agreements: Politi cs, Law and Economics,1: 9–29.
21 •• The Partnerships Resource Centre - Working paper 009
Insti tuti ons, Partnerships and Insti tuti onal change:  Towards a theoreti cal framework
